Philosopher
Last reviewed:
1919–2001 · Analytic philosophy · Modern
Elizabeth Anscombe was a student of Wittgenstein and a central figure in analytic moral philosophy and the philosophy of action. Her 1958 paper 'Modern Moral Philosophy' told her colleagues that the concepts of moral obligation and of the moral 'ought' ought to be jettisoned if that was psychologically possible, because they were survivals of a divine law without the lawgiver.
She did not mean that harm does not matter. She meant that words like unjust, untruthful, and cruel do more honest work, and that moral philosophy should wait on a better philosophy of psychology. Intention, her book, argues that actions are intentional under a description, and that 'why?' is the question that shows it. She was also a Catholic philosopher who could argue in public, including against honours she thought a government had not earned.
The 1958 paper is a founding document of the revival of virtue ethics, taken up differently by Philippa Foot and by Alasdair MacIntyre. It is an argument about language and foundations. It is not a mood of anti-morality, and it is not three slogans. The jettisoning sentence is the famous one of three theses.
Three sentences from the opening of 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (1958) are secured: the three theses, on a philosophy of psychology, on jettisoning the moral 'ought', and on the slight importance of the differences among English moralists from Sidgwick on. Further lines from Intention are arguments that turn on a why, not mottoes, and this page does not invent them.
'Modern Moral Philosophy', the whole paper, not the one sentence.
The sentence is a proposal about a vocabulary. The paper says what she wants instead, and what she thinks is missing from the psychology.
“The concepts of obligation and duty — moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say — and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought', ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible.”
G. E. M. Anscombe · Analytic philosophy
“It is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.”
G. E. M. Anscombe · Analytic philosophy
“My third thesis is that the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance.”
G. E. M. Anscombe · Analytic philosophy
Moral 'ought'
A leftover of law, in her diagnosis, once the lawgiver is gone.
Virtue
Justice and the vices are the vocabulary she trusts more than a special moral sense.
Intention
An action is intentional under a description. Asking why reveals the structure.
Intention (1957)
The small book that reset the philosophy of action.
Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)
The paper in Philosophy. Three theses, one of them famous.
None of the lines this library files for G. E. M. Anscombe is marked Questionable or Misattributed. That is only a fact about these cards. It is not a certificate that every popular sentence is theirs.
'Modern Moral Philosophy', the whole paper, not the one sentence. The sentence is a proposal about a vocabulary. The paper says what she wants instead, and what she thinks is missing from the psychology.
This library does not measure fame, and it does not rank lines by how often they are shared. The first line it files for G. E. M. Anscombe that is not marked Questionable or Misattributed is “The concepts of obligation and duty — moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say — and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought', ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible.” ('Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy 33 (1958), Well attested).
None of the lines this library files for G. E. M. Anscombe is marked Misattributed or Questionable. That is a fact about these cards, not a certificate that every popular sentence is theirs.
Moral 'ought': A leftover of law, in her diagnosis, once the lawgiver is gone.