Quotation
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To call a living thing good or defective is to measure it against the form of life of its species. Moral evaluation of human beings is a case of that kind of judgement, not a separate invention.
Philippa Foot · Virtue ethics · Modern · 2001
What does it mean?
The mainstream reading is that 'good' in a human life works as it does for other living things. A good root, a good wolf, a good human being: each is judged by the life-form of the species, by what flourishing for that kind of thing involves. A competing reading hears a crude biology, as if a description of evolution settled every moral question. She is making a logical point about evaluation, and she thinks human good includes virtues such as justice and not only survival. The claim is the thesis of Natural Goodness (2001), developed in the early chapters. It is a summary, and the badge says so. The 1978 essay, already here, says virtues are corrective. This book asks what makes a trait a virtue in a living thing of our kind. The 1972 paper had treated moral oughts as hypothetical. Readers argue about how far this later book revises that. The card does not pretend the revision is a single sentence.
Did Philippa Foot really say this?
The library’s label is Summary. Summary, not a sentence copied from one page. The card restates the thesis of Natural Goodness. Chapters 2 and 3 set out natural goodness and defect in plants and animals, and then in human beings. The 1972 paper and the 1978 essay are different works and different cards.
Where it comes from
Natural Goodness (2001), the central thesis, especially chapters 2 and 3
Approximate date: 2001.
How to use it
Calling a policy inhumane and calling a roof defective are, on this thesis, closer than they look. Both say that something of a certain kind is failing at what that kind of thing does. The comparison will not decide a housing case. It stops the word good from being treated as a mere clap of approval with no standard behind it. If you cannot say what the life-form requires, her account says you have not yet evaluated.
A mindset reading
Species and life-form are doing technical work. The habit is not to hear 'natural' as 'whatever happens'. Defects happen. They are still defects, on her account, because of how the kind of thing lives. That is the claim to test, not a mood about nature.
Understand the philosophy
Natural Goodness argues that moral evaluation is a species of the evaluation of living things. The key phrase is natural goodness and defect. Chapters 2 and 3 carry the thesis summarised here. 'Virtues and Vices' is the earlier essay about virtues as correctives. The 1972 paper is the earlier claim about hypothetical imperatives. The three should not be collapsed. A sentence was not invented to make them collapse.
- ethics
- virtue
FAQ
What does it mean?
The mainstream reading is that 'good' in a human life works as it does for other living things. A good root, a good wolf, a good human being: each is judged by the life-form of the species, by what flourishing for that kind of thing involves. A competing reading hears a crude biology, as if a description of evolution settled every moral question. She is making a logical point about evaluation, and she thinks human good includes virtues such as justice and not only survival. The claim is the thesis of Natural Goodness (2001), developed in the early chapters. It is a summary, and the badge says so. The 1978 essay, already here, says virtues are corrective. This book asks what makes a trait a virtue in a living thing of our kind. The 1972 paper had treated moral oughts as hypothetical. Readers argue about how far this later book revises that. The card does not pretend the revision is a single sentence.
Did Philippa Foot really say this?
Summary. Summary, not a sentence copied from one page. The card restates the thesis of Natural Goodness. Chapters 2 and 3 set out natural goodness and defect in plants and animals, and then in human beings. The 1972 paper and the 1978 essay are different works and different cards.
Which work is it in?
Natural Goodness (2001), the central thesis, especially chapters 2 and 3 Approximate date: 2001.