Quotation
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The moral ought gives a reason for acting only where the person already has the relevant aim. It is a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical one.
Philippa Foot · Virtue ethics · Modern · 1972
What does it mean?
The mainstream reading is a challenge to the special 'must' of morality. A hypothetical imperative binds you if you have the aim. A categorical one is supposed to bind you anyway. She argues that the moral ought is the first kind: it gives a reason to the person who has the relevant aim, and not, merely as moral, to the person who does not. A competing reading hears a permit for cruelty, as if she thought there was nothing to say to the unjust person. She thinks there is a great deal to say about vice and injury. What she denies is that the word ought, said in a special tone, is itself a reason. The paper is 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives' (1972). The card on virtues as corrective is from a different essay and is also a summary. This one is the claim about reasons. It is marked Summary because the paper argues the thesis rather than isolating this English as a motto.
Did Philippa Foot really say this?
The library’s label is Summary. Summary, not a sentence lifted from one page. The card restates the thesis of Foot's 1972 paper: moral judgements do not, merely by being moral, give every person a reason to obey them. The essay 'Virtues and Vices' is a different card.
Where it comes from
'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', The Philosophical Review 81 (1972), the thesis of the paper
Approximate date: 1972.
How to use it
Telling a colleague they morally ought to stay late, when they do not share the aim that would make the staying intelligible, is the use of ought she thinks fails as a reason. You may still call the refusal unjust or callous, if that is what it is. The paper asks you not to pretend the moral tone supplied a reason that the person's aims did not. The difference matters in a meeting, and it is not a licence to be callous yourself.
A mindset reading
A thesis stated as a summary should not be carved as a quotation. The habit is to say 'her argument in the 1972 paper' rather than 'her words'. The argument can be accepted or rejected. The badge is what keeps the rejection honest.
Understand the philosophy
The 1972 paper asks whether moral judgements are categorical imperatives in Kant's sense. Foot's answer, stated here as a paraphrase, is that they are hypothetical. The key term is a reason for acting. 'Virtues and Vices' (1978), already in this library, is about virtues as correctives, not about this distinction. Natural Goodness, later, will give a different account of evaluation and is a separate card. She changed her mind over a long career. This sentence is the 1972 view, not the last one.
- ethics
- mind
FAQ
What does it mean?
The mainstream reading is a challenge to the special 'must' of morality. A hypothetical imperative binds you if you have the aim. A categorical one is supposed to bind you anyway. She argues that the moral ought is the first kind: it gives a reason to the person who has the relevant aim, and not, merely as moral, to the person who does not. A competing reading hears a permit for cruelty, as if she thought there was nothing to say to the unjust person. She thinks there is a great deal to say about vice and injury. What she denies is that the word ought, said in a special tone, is itself a reason. The paper is 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives' (1972). The card on virtues as corrective is from a different essay and is also a summary. This one is the claim about reasons. It is marked Summary because the paper argues the thesis rather than isolating this English as a motto.
Did Philippa Foot really say this?
Summary. Summary, not a sentence lifted from one page. The card restates the thesis of Foot's 1972 paper: moral judgements do not, merely by being moral, give every person a reason to obey them. The essay 'Virtues and Vices' is a different card.
Which work is it in?
'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', The Philosophical Review 81 (1972), the thesis of the paper Approximate date: 1972.