“The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is that to every account an equal account is opposed.”
Sextus Empiricus · Pyrrhonism
Philosopher
Last reviewed:
c. 2nd–3rd century CE · Pyrrhonism · Ancient
Sextus Empiricus, a medical man of the second or third century CE, is the author who allows us to read ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism in its own words. Pyrrho of Elis, the namesake, left nothing. What Sextus wrote, the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, describes a practice rather than a doctrine that nothing is true. To every account an equal account is opposed.
When the weights match, the sceptic suspends judgement. The aim is not a prize for cleverness. Sextus says that suspension arrived, unexpectedly, with ataraxia, freedom from the turmoil of needing a verdict. He is careful, at least on his own telling, not to deny how things appear. Honey tastes sweet, he will say; whether it is sweet in its nature is what he will not affirm.
The practice is different from Academic scepticism, which he treats as still too doctrinal, and different from the modern personality of doubting everything. Montaigne and, later, Hume read him, and early modern philosophy is partly a set of answers to the problem he poses. The Greek is technical. A short quotation without the word for suspension will usually make him sound like a cynic in the modern sense, which he is not.
Four sourced passages from the Outlines of Pyrrhonism are included. Further familiar lines are omitted where the wording or locus is not secure. The modes of suspension are lists inside an argument, and a fifth English sentence cut out of them would look like a motto the book does not isolate.
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book 1, chapters 1–13.
He defines the practice himself, including the sentence about equal accounts, before the technical modes begin.
“The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is that to every account an equal account is opposed.”
Sextus Empiricus · Pyrrhonism
“Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity.”
Sextus Empiricus · Pyrrhonism
“The Sceptic's aim is tranquillity in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us.”
Sextus Empiricus · Pyrrhonism
“Suspension of judgement is a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything.”
Sextus Empiricus · Pyrrhonism
Equal accounts
The constitutive practice is to set against every argument an argument of equal weight.
Suspension
When the accounts balance, the response is epochē, a suspension of judgement, not a new dogma.
Untroubled life
Ataraxia is said to follow suspension as a side effect, not as a conclusion proved in advance.
Appearance kept
He does not claim that ordinary appearances fail to appear, only that he will not affirm the theory behind them.
Outlines of Pyrrhonism (c. 200 CE)
Three books defining the sceptical practice, the modes of suspension, and the replies to rival schools.
Against the Professors (c. 200 CE)
Longer critiques of grammar, rhetoric, geometry, and other dogmatic arts, sharing material with Against the Dogmatists.
None of the lines this library files for Sextus Empiricus is marked Questionable or Misattributed. That is only a fact about these cards. It is not a certificate that every popular sentence is theirs.
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book 1, chapters 1–13. He defines the practice himself, including the sentence about equal accounts, before the technical modes begin.
This library does not measure fame, and it does not rank lines by how often they are shared. The first line it files for Sextus Empiricus that is not marked Questionable or Misattributed is “The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is that to every account an equal account is opposed.” (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.12, Paraphrase or translation).
None of the lines this library files for Sextus Empiricus is marked Misattributed or Questionable. That is a fact about these cards, not a certificate that every popular sentence is theirs.
Equal accounts: The constitutive practice is to set against every argument an argument of equal weight.